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While changes in the demand for skilled labor appear to have led to a widening of the
wage structures in many countries during the 1980s, considerable differences in the levelof wage
inequality remain. In this paper, we examine the sources of these differences, focusing primarily
on explaining the considerably higher level of wage inequality in the U.S. We fmd that the
greater overall dispersion of the U.S. wage distribution reflects considerably more compression
at the bottom of the disthbution in the other countries, but relatively little difference in the degree
of wage inequality at the top. While differences in the distribution of measured characteristics
help to explain some aspects of the international differences, U.S. labor market prices--that is,
higher rewards to labor market skills--arc an important factor. Labor market institutions, chiefly
the relatively decentralized wage-setting mechanisms in the U.S. compared to other countries,
appear to provide the most persuasive explanation for theseinternational differences in prices.
In contrast, the pattern of cross-country differences in relative supplies of and demands for skills
does not appear to be consistent with the pattern of observed differences in wage inequality.
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The level of wage inequality generated by a country's labor market is of fundamental
importance for those interested in understanding poverty, social stratification and economic
incentives facing workers. Labor earnings are by far the most important component of income
for individuals who are employed; hence, in the absence of any compensatory government
policies, low living standards in market economies will be associated with low labor incomes.1
More generally, labor market inequality isa major determinant of disparities in living
standards. The level of labor market inequality may also influence the solidarity that
individuals feel with one another. Workers with similar earnings most likely feel more in
common with each other than those with vastly different economic rewards and status.
To the extent that labor market inequality reflects economic returns to skills (as
opposed to heterogeneity in skill levels across individuals), international differences in
inequality imply differences in economic incentives. Countries with high rewards to skills
have a wage structure that encourages skill acquisition by their workers, while the compression
of wage premia for skills may dampen workers' incentives to acquire appropriate training.
Moreover, centralized wage-setting mechanisms which reduce wage variation tend to limit
firms' flexibility in responding to differences in market conditions across industries or
geographical areas.2 Also of concern is that relatively high wages for low skill groups may
reduce their relative employment.3 On the other hand, a down-side of high rewards to labor
An example of the importance of labor market inequality is provided by the U.S. experience
in the l9SOs when rising wage inequality was sufficient to counteract the effects of economic
expansion in reducing poverty (Blank, 1991; Cutler and Katz, 1991).
2 Employers have voiced both these complaints about Sweden's usolidarityw wage policy, and
that country's generous student stipends and subsidized loans for higher education may be
viewed in part as a means of offsetting the distortions caused by wage compression (Edin and
Hoirnlund, forthcoming).
For example, Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (forthcoming) report that in France, where
the minimum wage increased from 45.7 to 53.3 percent of median earnings from 1967 to
1987, the problem of youth unemployment has been more severe and the durationof
unemployment has tended to be longer than in other OECD countries.-2-
marketskillsis that theypenalizedemographic groups with below average levels of skills,
eveninthe absenceofexplicit discrimination against them. For example, the rising rewards to
skills intheU.S. inthe 198CM have been found toreduce therelative wagesof blackworkers
(Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1991)and immigrants (LaLondeand Topel, 1992); and Blau and
Kahn (1992andforthcoming) found that the higher rewards to skills in the U.S. compared to
other industrialized countries contributed to a higher gender pay gap in the U.S.
Considerable attention has lately been focused on the trend toward rising wage
inequality that has been occurring in most of the industrialized countries.4 Evidence that
inequality increased in different countries with different institutional structures suggests that
similar forces havebeenat work. For example, it has been suggested that technology and
international trade haveraisedthe relative demand for skilled workersamongindustrialized
nations (Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower,forthcoming).
While changes in the demand for skilled labor appear to have led to a widening of the
wage structures in many countries during the 198CM, considerable differences in the level of
wage inequality remain. Of particular interest to us, the United States has a far greater
dispersion of wages than other industrialized countries (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992; BIau
and Kahn, 1992 and forthcoming). Previous international comparative work onwage
inequality has focused on recent changes in wage dispersion. In this paper, we are concerned
with understanding the fundamental causes of the higher level ofwage inequality in the U.S.
compared to other industrialized countries in the 1980s. We concentrate on males in order to
focus on a relatively homogeneous sample of workers for eachcountry.5
For evidence of rising inequality in several countries, see Katz, Lovenian and Blanchflower
(forthcoming), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Katz and Murphy (1992), Bound and Johnson
(1992), Erickson and Ichino (forthcoming), Edin and Holmiund (forthcoming), Davis (1992).
and Gottschalk and Joyce (1991).
In Blau and Kahn (1992 and forthcoming), we consider theconsequences of differences in
wage inequality across countries for international differences in the gender gap.
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The basicpattern of international differencesinwage inequality that we seektoexplain
isillustratedinFigure1.' As expected based onprevious work, the U.S. hasa considerably
higher level of wage inequality than the other industrial countries in our sample. Panels (a)
and (b) of Figure 1 indicate that both the standard deviation of log wages and the 90-10
percentile log wage differential are considerably greater in the U.S. than in the other countries.
Interestingly, however, this higher level of inequality reflects considerably more compression
at the bottom of the distribution in the other countries relative to the U.S.,butrelatively little
difference in the degree of wage inequality at the top of the distribution. Thus, while the 50-
10 percentile wage differential is much larger in the U.S. than elsewhere (panel c), the U.S.
90-50 differential is quite similar to that in the other countries (panel d). This pattern of
greater compression at the bottom is important from a policy perspective in that it implies that
the labor market reward structure in other countries generates less poverty and relatively
higher incomes for less skilled groups than in the U.S.'Of course,as suggested above, there
are potential costs ofwagecompression which would have to be compared to these benefits in
deciding whether this is a desirable approach.
In the empirical work below, we focus on three possible explanations for these
international differences in patterns of wage inequality. We first examine the role of
differences across countries in the distribution of measured characteristics. We conclude that
while measured characteristics help to explain some aspects of the international differences,
U.S.labormarket prices—that is, higher rewards to labor market skills and higher rents
received for employment in favored sectors—are an important factor contributing to the
observed differences in inequality between the U.S. and other countries.
• Details of the data sources and the method of calculating hours-corrected earnings are given
below.
The claim about poverty holds if we are domparing countries with similar average real wage
levels, as is the case here. For example, in 1988, hourly compensation in manufacturing in
the OECD countries other than the U.S.averaged98% of the U.S. level, adjusting for
exchange rates (U. S. Department of Commerce, 1992,p.841).
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Second,we assess thecontribution of labormarket institutions toexplainingthe
differences in wage inequality. The United States has a largely nonunion labormarket with
very decentralized wage-setting even in the union sector. The other countries have
considerably higher rates of unionization, and most of them have much more centralizedwage-
setting processes than thoseofthe U.S. union sector. Further, in several countries, the terms
ofcollectivebargaining agreements are routinelyextendedto cover nonunionworkers,and
their larger union sectors may induce greater emulationof the unionwage structure bythe
nonunionsector.Finally, in some ofthecountries, thegovernmentor the union movement
hasfollowedexplicit policiesto raise the relative pay of the lowest-paid workers.
Considerationoflabor market institutionsthussuggests less labor market inequality in
these other countries than in the U.S.; andmay alsoimplygreater compressionatthebottom
ofthe distribution thanat the top.Thisis, ofcourse,consistent with thepatternof inequality
which we identify empirically.Moreover, wepresentinformation onthe natureof union and
nonunionpatternsof inequaiity which revealsinteresting featuresofthedifferences between
theU.S.and other countries in the impact oflabormarket institutions.Specifically,our
results imply that union pay policies whichbring up the bottomoftheunion wage distribution
are commontoall countries, includingthe U.S.However, unionsinothercountriesappearto
be more successfulthanU.S. unions both in reducing inequality in theunion sectorand in
extendingsuch policies tothenonunion sector.
Third,we examineinternationaldifferences in the supply ofanddemand for labor
market skills as an alternative explanation for theobserveddifferences in inequality between
theU.S.and other countries. We find that market forces,asbest as wecanmeasure them, do
notappearto be aviable explanation for the international differences,further increasing our
confidencethat institutions are important. Finally,examining the impactof centralization
across the countries in our sample more generally, wefindthat thedegreeof wage
centralization, as commoniymeasuredby comparative industrial relations researchers, is
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negativelyassociated with wage dispersion, the 50-10differentialin the log of wages, and the
pay gap between middle and low skill workers.
IL Determinants of Wage Inequality: Skills and InstitutIons
Wage inequality as measured by overall wage variation or by the wage gap between
workers at different parts of the distribution (e.g. the 10th vs. the 50th percentile) is affected
by the distribution of skills, both measured and unmeasured, and the prices determined for
those skills in the labor market. This price structure may include rents received by individuals
employed in certain favored sectors. Prices, in turn, are influenced by both market and
institutional forces.
Market forces determine skill prices through the interaction of the supply and demand
for skills. Suppose that workers of different skill levels (e.g. high school or college educated
workers) are imperfect substitutes in production. Then differences in the relative supply of or
demand for skills will produce differences in relative lages across countries.8 The effects of
demand can be felt both within and between industries. Final demand for output in one
country may favor industries that (world-wide) disproportionately employ highlyskilled
workers, relative to final demand in other countries, If such is the case, then the relative
demand for skilled workers in the former country will be higher than in the latter; and, all else
equal, we would expect skilled workers to do relatively well even in industries not directly
affected by the high demand level. It is also possible that the relative demand for highly
skilled labor is greater in each industry in one country than another, if different technologies
are employed.
Institutional factors include the extent of collective bargaining coverage, the scope of
collective bargaining where it occurs, union pay policies, and government policy toward the
8Thisassumes barriers to the mobility of capital, labor, and/or goods across national
boundaries so that skill prices are not equalized.
DITWAO.DOC2/22/94 3:27 PM-6-
labor market. From each of these perspectives, we expect the U.S. to have a moreunequal
wage structure than other countries. The following decomposition of a country's overall level
of wage inequality is useful in understanding the role of unions in producing differences in
inequality across countries:
(1) Vj =cqV+ (1-aDvnj + ixj(waiwi)2 +
where for country i, v is the overall variance of log wages; a is the fraction of workers
unionized; Vaandv are the variance of log union and nonunion wages; Wa and Wn are
average log union and nonunion wages; and w* is the country's avenge log wage level.'
By the accounting scheme in equation (1), there are several routes through which the
industrial relations system can affect overall wage inequality. First, unionstypically raise their
members' relative wages. This effect alone could increase or decrease overallwage
dispersion, dependingonwhere union workers would have been in the wage distribution in the
absence of unionism. However, as suggested bythe finaltwo terms in equation (1),in an
accountingsense, it is the union-nonunion wage gap (not controlling for other wage-
influencing factors) itself that is important in 'explaining" the overall variance. All else equal,
the larger this gap, however it is achieved, the larger thecountry's overall wage variance will
be. And our data show that this gap is much higher for the U.S. than other countries.'0
Second, unions typically negotiate contracts that allow for less variation inpay than
occurs in the nonunion sector (Freeman, 1982; Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992). Unions are
!Freeman(1980) uses such a decomposition to assess the role of unionism on U.S. wage
inequality. See also Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) who employ a similar approach to
measunng the impact of industry on wage inequality.
10 Much of this higher U.S. union-nonunionwage differential is due to a higher ceteris
paflba,U.S. union-nonunion wage gap rather than to differences in the personal
characteristics of union and nonunion workers (Blanchflower andFreeman, 1992). Thus, a
strong causal role for the industrial relations system is suggested.
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much less prevalent in the U.S. than elsewhere; thus the lower union variance in pay would
get a smaller weight in equation (1) in the U.S. Hence, we would expect a higher overall
variance in wages in the U.S. even if the variance of wages within the union and nonunion
sectors were identical across countries. However, there are strong reasons for expecting both
of these within sector variances to be higher in the U.S. than elsewhere. These higher within
sector variances constitute a third route by which the U.S. industrial relations system raises
wage inequality relative to other countries.
Withrespectto the union sector, collective bargaining in the U.S. is relatively
decentralized, with an emphasis on single-firm agreements which, in most cases, are not firm-
wide (Hendricks and Kahn, 1982). In contrast, as discussed below, in most of the other
countries in our sample, bargaining is conducted on an industry-wide or even an economy-
wide level. Thus, there appears to be more scope for interfirm and interindustxy wage
differentials in the U.S. than in other countries; and a substantial portion of the wage
inequality we observe in the U.S. is associated with such firm or industry wage effects (Blau,
1977;Groshen, 1991;Davis and Haltiwanger, 1991; Krueger and Summers, 1988).
While a lower variance in the union sector of other countries could be achieved either
by raisingthebottom,restraining the top, or both,centralizedbargains often emphasize the
settingof wage minimaacrossdiverse units. For example in Austria, Germany, Italy, Sweden
and Switzerland (as well as in several European countries outside our sample), collective
bargainirgagreements, generally at the industry level, set minimum rates for thelowest pay
group in a collective agreement (EIRR, Oct. 1992). Such minima,to the extent they are
binding, will tend to disproportionately bring up the floor among workerscovered by the
contract. In the limiting case, a contract that covered all workers in the economy mightbe
expected to compress the bottom of the distribution, just as would a highnational minimum
wage. Thus, we expect to find greater narrowing at the bottomthan at the top in the union
sector in most countries compared to the U.S., but regard this as to some extent anempirical
question.
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Several factors also lead us to expect more dispersion of nonunionwages in the U.S.
than elsewhere. These include the practice in many other countries ofextending the terms of
collective bargaining agreements to. nonunion workers. Such. contract extensionsblur the
distinction between union and nonunion wage-setting in these countries. Tothe extent that
unions in all countries tend to compress wages at the bottom in the unionsector, contract
extension will not only reduce wage variation in the nonunionsector, but compress wages at
the bottom as well. In addition, the higher degree of unionorganization outside the U.S.
should produce more "voluntary imitation of unionpay structures by nonunion firms than in
the U.SY Finally, the impact of these factors has been furtherstrengthened by explicit union
and government policies in some countries to bringup the bottom of the wage distribution.
ilL Overview of International Differences in Labor MarketInstitutions
In this section, we provide a brief review of the institutionalarrangements governing
wage determination in the countries in our sample which suggests thatwage-setting is indeed
more decentralized in both the union and nonunion sectors in the U.S.Looking first at the
union sector, Sweden and Norway exempli& thehighest degree of centralization of wage-
setting in these countries. There, the major union federation (LO)signs an agreement with the
employer association (SAP) covering a major portion of the labor force(Leion, 1985;
Thorsrud, 1985). Austrian collective bargaining is alsovery centralized, with agreements in
most cases covering an entire industry orgroup of industries throughout the country (Tomandl
and Fuerboeck, 1986). In Germany, contractsusually cover all employers in an industry in a
state, providing a higher degree of centnlirnion than in the U.S. butprobably less than in
Scandinavia or Austria (Kennedy, 1982). And inItaly, master industry-wide agreements
" This will be thecase if union "threat' effects dominate any negative 'crowding" effects in
the nonunion sector caused by the adverseemployment effects of unionism. Kaim and Curme
(1987) found for the U.S. that, other things equal, nonunionwage dispersion was lower in highly unionized than in less unionized industries.
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negotiated at the national level between unions and employer associations have traditionally
been the norm (Katz, 1993). Collective bargaininginAustralia has also been characterized by
considerable centralization, as the system heavily relies on government tribunals and
compulsory arbitration in setting wages (Katz, 1993). It has been estimated that about 90
percent of the Australian labor force has its pay set by these tribunals (Killingsworth, 1990).
Hungarywassurveyed during the period of Communist party rule. While most workers were
inunions, wageswere controlled by the state, providing another example ofcentralizedwage
determination (Rezler, 1972-3;U.S. DepartmentofLabor,1992).For eachofthese
countries, we would expect less dispersion of union wages than in the U.S.
Collectivebargaining in Switzerland and Britain is less centralized than in Scandinavia,
AustriaandGermany, but likely more centralized than in the U.S.WhileBritain, like the
U.S.,hadamixtureofsingle-firmand multiemployeragreements,inthe1970s,thelatest
period for which quantitative data are available, bargaining appeared to be more centralized in
Britain. In the U.K.for 1977-78, 25 percentof manufacturing contracts covered more than
onefinn(Deaton andBeaumont, 1980), while for the U.S. the figure in 1975 wasonly 13
percent (Hendricks and Kahn, 1982).Switzerlandappearstohave a mix ofcentralizationand
decentralization. Ontheone hand, many agreements exclude the subject ofpay,leaving it to
individual determination. Onthe otherhand, there are no antitrust laws,andparties are
encouraged toform associations,leaving openthe possibilityofdefactocentralization
(Wrong,1987). Further, ithas been estimated that about halfof the Swissprivate sector work
force is coveredby industry collective bargaining agreements (EIRR,Oct. 1992).
Eventsin the1980s and1990s have led to the decentralization ofbargaininginvirtually
every industrialized country.'2 In Scandinavia, the influence ofthe centralSAF-LO
agreement was reduced starting inthe1980s.InAustralia, tribunal decisionshaveallowed
12 This discussion ofrecenttrends is based onKatz(1993) and Edin and Holmlund
(forthcoming).
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moreinterfirm variation 'in wage settlements. InGermanyand Italy, bargaining hasshifted in
some cases fromtheindustry to the plant level inthelate 1980s. InBritain and theUnited
States,multiemployer units continued to crumble in the 1980s and 1990s.
We have no way of knowing whether decentralization has proceeded faster outsidethe
U.S. than inside. Nonetheless, one's impression is that, with the possibleexception of Britain,
systemsof collectivebargaining remain more centralized in the other countries than in the
United States. TheU.S.does nothave the centralizinginstitutions that are still in place in
theseothercountries. Md deunionization proceeded much more rapidly in the U.S. than in
other countries (including Britain), providing an extreme form of decentralization
(Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992; Katz, 1993).
The structure of collective bargaining thus leads us toexpect more dispersion of union
wages in the U.S. than elsewhere. A review of labor market institutions in other countries
leads us to expect more dispersion of nonunionwages in the U.S. as well. In Australia, wage
tribunalssetminimumpayrates across both the union and nonunion sectors, while in then
CommunistHungary,wagesin bothsectors werecontrolledbythe state.In Germany,
Austria,Italy, and Switzerland,thegovernmentroutinelyextends the terms of collective
bargaining agreements to nonunionworkers.'3It has been estimated that as of 1992, legally
binding industryor sectorailevel agreements covered 90 percent ofworkersin Germany, 98
percentinAustria,the vastmajority"in Italy, and "nearly all"workplacesinSweden(EIRR,
Oct.1992). In Switzerland, in 1992, roughly 10percentof all workers (or about20 percent
of nonunion workers) were nonunion employees whosewages had beenset throughcontract
extensions (EIRR, Oct. 1992). These figures for 1992suggest that whatever trends there have 'SeeKennedy (1982), Toznandl and Fuerboeck (1986), Treu (1990), and EIRR (Oct. 1992).
A sizable proportion of Italian workers areself-employed or work in an underground or
informal sector in which government-mandated benefitsare not paid. The self-employed are
not included in our analysis due to our interest in thewage determination process for wage and
salary workers. Further, it is likely that since informal sectoremployment is illegal, it is
underreported by the respondents in our survey-based data. Thus,we may understate wage
inequality in Italy.
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been toward decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s, wage setting remains considerably more
centralized in Western Europe than in the U.S.
Finally, in Sweden,Italy, and West Germany, explicitunion andgovernment policies
have been followedthatwould be expected to lead to strong compression at the bottom of the
distribution. From 1968 to1974, the LU in Sweden made a conscious effort to raise the
relativewages of lower-paid workers,leadingto a sharp fall in inequality (Edin and
Holmlund,1992).In Italy, the wage indexationsystem, the scala mobile, in place from 1975
to 1992, gave across-the-board tin increases in wages in response to inflation. The system
was designed to reduce skilled-nonskilled pay differentials (EIRR, Aug. 1992; Treu, 1990).
By 1990, Italian employers claimed that accumulated indexation payments accounted for 40
percent of labor costs (EIRR, Jan. 1990). While other aspects of the pay package to some
degree counteracted the leveling effects of indexation, Erickson and Ichino (forthcoming)
found that the system still had some independent effect in reducing inequality. Finally, in
recent years in Germany, some unions have succeeded in getting above sectoral levels of wage
increases for low paid workers, in an attempt to raise the floor (EIRR, Nov. 1992).
IV. Results
A. DataSourcesandthe Definition of Hours-Corrected Earnings
Wecompiled micro-data from several sources to examine international differences in
male wage inequality. First, we used the International Social Survey Programme (155?) for
the following countries and time periods: Austria (1985-87 and 1989), West Germany (1985-
88), Hungary (1986-88), Switzerland (1987), Britain (1985-89), the United States (1985-89),
and Norway (1989). Second, we supplemented the ISSP with several other micro-data bases
in order to expand our coverage of countries. Specifically, we used the Class Structure and
Class Consciousness (CSCC) data base compiled by Erik Wright for Sweden (1980) and
Norway (1982); the Income Distribution Survey (IDS) for Australia (1986); and a Bankof
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Italy (BI) survey for Italy (1987).'Third, weperformed a special comparison for 1984
between the U.S. and Sweden using two additional data bases with more detailed information
on personal characteristics and earnings, the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(P511)) and the Swedish Household Market and Nonmarket Activities Survey (HUS).15 In this
portion of the analysis, the sample is restricted to fuU-time workers and, in the case of the
U.S. data, to whites. White males are used instead of all males in order to produce a
relatively homogeneous U.S. sample to compare with the Swedish data. (The 155? did not
collect information on race.)
The specific earnings measures used in the data for each country are described in detail
in the Appendix. For all cases except the 1984 Sweden-U.S. comparison, the earnings figure
is expressed on an annual or monthly basis. The computation ofwage rates from such data is
complicated by the omission of information on annual weeks worked.'6 Data on weekly hours
worked are available, however, allowing for some adjustment of earnings for time input
(described below). For the 1984 Sweden-U.S. comparison, we are able to compute hourly
earnings.
With the exception of the 1984 HUS (Sweden) and PSID (U.S.), the earnings variable
was generally coded into categories.'7 In the analyses presented below, we arbitrarily coded
'Fordescriptions of these data, see Blanchflower and Freeman (1992)—ISSP; Rosenfeld and
Kalleberg (1990)—CSCC; Blackburn and Bloom (1991)—IDS; and Erickson and Ichino
(forthcoming)—BI. The ISSP had information on Italy, but it did not collect data on the
respondents' industriaj sector. We therefore used the BI data instead. Further, preliminary
results indicated that the Australian data in the ISSP were inconsistent with othersources,
leading us to use the more consistent IDS data.
'5Fora description of the PSII), see Blau and Kahn (1993), and for information on the HUS,
see Edin and Holinlund (forthcoming).
"ForAustralia and for a subset of the 1982 Norway data, weeks worked information is
available. However, we treat these countries similarly to the others in order to maintain
comparability.
The Australian earnings data were originally reported as a continuous variable. However,
to maintain comparability with the other countries, we recoded the Australianearnings into the
ISSP's intervals for Australia. When the analysis wasperformed for Australia using the
original continuous variable, the results were virtually identical to those reported here. The B!
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the top(open-ended) category as 1.2timesits minimum value. Our resultswerenot sensitive
toassumptions about top-coding. Finally, concern about adequate sample size led us to pool
years of data for those ISSPcountriessurveyed more than once (see above). However, since
the multiple years of data on Sweden and Norway come from different sources, we do not pool
them.
Thehours-correctedearnings variable shown in Figure 1 is computed as follows. For
each country, the following regression was estimated:
(2) InEARN =b0 + b1PART+ b3HFULL +B'X + e,
whereInEARN isthelog of earnings;PART is a dummy variableforpart-timework(less
than 35 hours per week); URPART and ERPULL are interactions of weeklywork hourswith
pan-andfull-time status;Xisa vectorofexplanatoryvariables including years ofschooling,
potentialexperience and its square, a dummy variable for those married, spouse present,a
union membership dummyvariable, one-digitindustryand occupation dummies, and year
dummiesfor thecountries forwhich we pooleddifferentyearsofdata;and eis an error term.
(SeeAppendix TableA-I for variable definitions.)18
The PART, HRPART, HRFULL andyear dummyvariable coefficientsfrom (2)were
usedto adjusteachperson's earnings for workhoursand year by assuming a40 hour work
week andtheendyear of the pooled years. That is,for eachworkeri,wehave:
data were also continuous butdidnotmatchupwith the ISSP categoriesforItaly. We
thereforeused thecontinuous earningsvariable forItaly.
16 Maritalstatuswas notavailable for Italy; unionstatuswas not available for Australia or
Italy. For the purposeofcomparingtheU.S. to thesecountries,we estimated U.S. equations
thatconformed tothe samespecificationas eachcountry.In analysesofthe U.. PSID and
theSwedishHUS datashown below, actual labormarketexperienceisused; union status is




where YFTJLListhe log of hours-correctedearnings,the b's are estimated coefficients, and Tt
and YRt are, respectively, estimated coefficient and dummy variable vectors referring to the
pooled years of data. For the 1984 U.S.-Sweden comparison, the earnings variable is hourly
earnings, based on the previous year'searningsdivided by the previous year' s work hours.'9
Measures of inequality calculated on the basis of hours-corrected earnings were
presented in Figure land are also shown in Panel A of Table 1. Weagain see that the U.S.
has a considerably larger standard deviation of earnings and 90-10gap than the other
countries. However, whereas the U.S. 50-10 earnings differential is much larger than it is in
the other countries (0.582 log points above the nonU.S. average), the 90-50 differential in the
U.S. is smaller than in Britain, Switzerland and Hungary and only slightlylarger than in
Germany,Austria,and Norway (1989); the U.S. 90-50 gap and is only slightly (0.007 log
points) larger than the unweightedavenge forthe other countries. Similar results are obtained
fora comparison ofloghourlyearningsbetween the U.S. and Sweden in 1984(PanelB).The
U.S. 50-10 differential is much larger (0.518logpoints) than it is in Sweden, while the 90-50
gap is only 0.158 log points higher.
B. The Role of Prices and Measured Characteristics
A crucial question raised by the results shown in Table 1 is thedegree to which the
observed differences in wage dispersion between the U.S. and other countriesare due to
differences in measured characteristics versus differences in theprices of labor market skills
(i.e., wage structure). To shed light on this issue, we employ a fun distributionalaccounting
For the U.S. PSID sample, we excludedanyone earning less than $1 per hour or more than
$250 per hour in 1983 dollars. The U.S. minimumwage was $3.35/hr at the time. For
Sweden, we excluded anyone earning less than 7 bonerper hour, or about 1/7 the avenge
measured wage. This exclusion restriction was made since $1was about 1/7 the U.S. average.
Since the U.S. wage distribution is more dispersed than theSwedish, any error caused by. these
exclusion restrictions will lead us to understate the Swedish-U.S. difference inwage dispersion.
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scheme developed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) to study intertemporal changes in U.S.
wageinequality.
We begin with awageequation for worker iincountry j:
(4) YFULLjJ= PjZj + (YjOjj,
where YFULL is hours-corrected (and year-corrected) log earnings (orhourly earningsforthe
1984Sweden-U.S. comparison), Z is a vector of measured characteristics, B is a vector of
coefficients, 9 is a standardized residual with mean 0 and variance 1, and o is the residual
standard deviation of log hours-corrected earnings.
The first hypothetical distribution for country j is the set of wages that would emerge if
we applied the estimated U.S.wagefunction (Pu) and residual standard deviation (cTu) to each
worker i incountryj:
(5) Y(l)ij =PuZij + CTuOij.
Y(l)j is computed for eachworkerin countryj byvaluinghis measured characteristics at the
U.S. coefficient vector fi andhispositionin hisown country's wage residuals (e.g.the 35th
percentile) at thecorresponding position in the U.S. residual distribution. The primary
differencebetween the distributionofYFULL for theUnited States and ofY(1) for countryj
isthe substitution of country j's distribution of measured characteristics for thoseofthe U.S.
in the U.S.wageequation.2° Construction of Y(1) is important because it allows us to
20Y(1)1alsousescountry j'sestimatedvalues of 0,but these arestandardizedacross
countrieland therefore do not directly contributeto international differences in the distribution
ofwages. However, to the extent that 8 is more strongly correlated withZfor one country
thananother,the difference betweenthedistribution of YFULLVand Y(1)jwillalso rf1!ct the
effects of this difference in correlation. We discuss differences in unmeasured productivity
characteristics below.
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determine the extent to which international differencesinthedistributionof wages are due to
differencesin the distribution of measuredcharacteristics.
Thesecondhypothetical distributionfor countryj resultsfromgiving each person in
countryj his own country's estimated wage coefficientsbuttheU.S. wageresidual
corresponding to his positioninhis own country's residual distribution:
(6) Y(2$j =PjZjj+ CuOjj.
The difference between the distributions of Y(2)jj andY(l)ij is entirely due to the difference
between country j's wage function and that of the United States.
Finally, the impact of wage residuals on country j's wage distribution relative to that of
the U.S. is the difference between the distribution of
YFULLij and Y(2)u.Wewould like to
interpret this as the effect of unmeasured prices (i.e. the difference betweenand aJ).
However, it also includes the effect of differences in the distribution of unmeasured
productivity characteristics. For example, while the U.S. residual distributionmay be more
dispersed than that of other countries because of higher prices of unmeasured skills, itmay
also be the case that the U.S. labor force is more diverse in its unmeasured characteristics.
This latter difference would be included in our estimate of the effect ofwage residuals, but
does not reflect unmeasured prices. Our review of the Literatureon wage-setting institutions
suggests that the U.S. does in fact have higher skill prices than other countries; but we cannot
rule out the possibility that some portion of thecross-country differences in wage variation
associated with the wage residuals reflects international differences in unmeasuredquantities as
well as unmeasured prices.
To further support the notion that unmeasured prices are important, wesupplement our
other analyses with a comparison of 1984 data from the U.S. P511) and the SwedishBUS
which is Likely to be less contaminated by unmeasuredheterogeneity than our other data
sources. Specifically, as noted above, for the 1984 U.S.-Swedish comparison,we use a
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sampleof white, full-Lime employed men from the U.S. and full-time employed men from
Sweden. Thus, racial heterogeneity in the U.S. will not directly affect this comparison. In
addition, we are able to construct actual average hourly earnings in these samples, again
reducingthe scopefor errors. Finally, we are able to control for actual, rather than potential
labor market experience. Whilepotentiallabor market experience is a good proxyfor actual
experience for men,fewererrors will result if one has data on thereal thing and ifthese data
are themselves accurate.21
Weperformthedecomposition ofdifferences in the wage distributionimplied by
equations(4)-(6) in two stages. Initially, we include in Z a vector of human capital
characteristics (education, potential experience and its square, and marital status). Next, we
augment the human capital variables with a vector of industry and occupation dummyvariables
and union status; i.e., we estimate equation (2) above. A comparison of the results front the
two specifications sheds light on the role of occupation, industry, and unionism in explaining
the international differences.
The results of performing this decomposition for the standard deviation of log wages
are shown in Table 2. Panel A of the Table shows the human capital specification results,
while Panel B shows the findings for the full specification. The actual U.S.-country
differences are shown in the first column. As may be seen in the second column of the Table,
the distribution of measured characteristics explains relatively little (about 6 percent, on
average) of the higher variation in wages in the U. S. than elsewhere under either
specification. In contrast, prices appear to be important in explaining the differences in
inequality between the U.S. and the other countries. In every instance, measured pricesand
residual effectsserveto raise the U.S. standard deviation of wages compared to each country.
21Inthe Swedish data, information on actual experience since age 16 is collected, whilein
the P50, the variable referstoyearsofexperience since age 18. To make the two variables
comparable, weaddedtwo times theU.S.whitemaleemployment/population ratio for ages
16-17 to thePSI])experience figure. These data werecollectedfrom USBLS fl985).
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Table 2 indicates that prices of measured characteristics explain a larger share than does the
distribution of measured characteristics—15 to 20 percent on avenge, with the bulk of the
difference between the U.S. and the other countries (741o79 percent) attributable to the larger
residual variation of wages in the U.S. Thus, prices of labor market skills (both measured
and unmeasured) appear to be the primary cause of the higher variation in wages in the U.S.,
although we cannot rule out the possibility that the distribution of unmeasured characteristics
also plays a role. The 1984 U.S.-Sweden comparison is instructive in this regard. Despite the
more homogeneous U.S. sample and the better measure of wages and experience, the results
are quite similar to the 1980 U.S.-Sweden comparison. Most notably, measured
characteristics actually play a smaller part in explaining the U.S.-Swedish difference in the
1984 comparison.
We explicitly compare the magnitude and sources of the 50-10 and the 90-50
differentials in Table 3. The results for the human capital specification are again shown in
Panel A and the results for the full specification in Panel B. The first column of both Panels
shows the actual U.S.-countryj difference in the 50-10 and 90-50logwage differentials. As
we saw above, these differences are considerably greater for the 50-10 gap (0.576 log points,
on average) than for the 90-50 gap (0.021 log points, on average)22 The second column of
Table 3 shows that these 50-10 vs. 90-50 comparisons are substantially affected by the
distribution of measured characteristics.
For each countxyj, the Measured Characteristics Effect is the difference between
YFULLIJ and Y(l) at the indicated percentiles of the distribution. The positive effects for the
50-10 differentials for both specifications indicate that the U.S. distribution of measured
characteristics widens the 50-10 gap compared to that in each country. These effects--O.245
log points for the human capital specification and 0.207 log points for the full specification, on
22Note,these figures differ slightly from those presented above because Sweden 1984 is now
mcluded m the non-US average.
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average—are large indeed. A comparison of the results for the two specifications indicates that
it is the U.S. distribution of human capital characteristicsthatis relevant in explaining the
international differences, with the U.S. distribution of industry, occupation and union status
slightlyloweringthe 50-10 gap compared to other countries.23 On average, measured
characteristics are estimated to account for 35.9 to 43.4 percent of the higher U.S. 50-10
differential. In contrast, the distribution of measured characteristics lowers the 90-50 wage
differential in the U.S. compared to other countries. In each case, the Effect is negative with
an unweighted avenge effect of about -0.16 log points in both specifications. For both the 50-
10and 90-50 analyses, we find the impact of measured characteristics to be quite similar for
the Sweden 1984 and Sweden 1980 comparisons, again suggesting that greater unmeasured
heterogeneity of U.S. workers is not driving our results.
The findings for the Measured Characteristics Effects imply that a considerable portion
of the wider 50-10 gap relative to the 90-50 gap in the U.S. is accounted for by differences in
the distribution of productive characteristics. With the same distribution of measured
characteristics, the avenge difference between the U.S. 50-10 gap and that for the other
countries would decline to 0.331 to 0.369 log points (from 0.576), while the figure for the 90-
50 gap would increase to about 0.18 (from 0.021). Thus, if we consider the part of the
differential which is not accounted for by measured characteristics (i.e., the sum of the Wage
Coefficients and Wage Residuals Effects) as potentially due to wage structure, we find that the
U.S. wage stricture widens both the top and the bottom of the wage distribution relative to
other countries. In particular, adding the Wage Coefficients and Wage Residuals Effects, we
find that in every case, U.S. prices lead to a widening of both the 50-10 and the 90-50
differentials compared to other countries.
23 To some degree union status, while treated here as a measured characteristic in Panel B of
Tables 2 and 3, could be considered part of the wage-setting institutions. The effects of
collective bargaining are investigated in detail below.
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In the decomposition shown in Tables 2 and 3, controlling for personal characteristics
is especially important, as it reveals the 90-50wideningeffect of U.S. prices, an effect that is
not apparent if one merely compares the raw 90-50 differential in the U.S. with that in other
countries. Further, it reduces the likelihood that we are overstating the compression at the
bottom (thatwouldoccur if one merely examined the raw 50-10 differentials). However, the
U.S. wage structure continues to widen the bottom by more than the top. This is trueon
avenge and in nine (Full Specification) or ten (Human Capital Specification) of eleven
possible cases. Such an effect is consistent with government and trade union wage policies in
other countries that have their biggest effect in bringing up the bottom of the distribution.
The last two columns of Table 3 show the effects of Wage Coefficients andWage
Residuals separately. For the 50-10 gap, the U.S. human capitalwage coefficients usually
have a small widening effect compared to the other countries (accounting for 4.2percent of the
difference, on average), although the effect is negative in four cases. The Coefficients Effect
is notably increased when the full specification is employed(accounting for 21.7 percent of the
difference, on avenge), suggesting that it is the prices associated with the industry, occupation
and unionism variables that are particularly high in the U.S. In bothspecifications, however,
the Wage Residuals Effect accounts for a substantial share (42.2 to 53.3percent) of the U.S.-
country jdifference.In the case of the 90-50 gap, the Coefficients and Residual Effects are
generally positive and do not differ very much between the two specifications. Thissuggests
that the impact of measured prices primarily reflectshigher prices of the human capital
variables in the U.S. The Coefficients and Residual Effects are ofroughly equal size, on
average.
C. The Effect of Institutions; Collective Bargaining and Contract Extension
In our discussion of trade unionism, four important pointswere emphasized that each
leads us to expect a higherwage dispersion in the U.S. than in other countries. First, the U.S.
is less unionized, implying arelatively smaller low variance sector. Second, the union-
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nonunion wage differential is larger in the U.S. Third, collective bargaining is more
centralized in other countries than in the U.S. Fourth, in several countries, the terms of
collective bargaining agreements are commonly extended by law to nonunion workers, a
feature not present in the U.S. industrialrelationssystem. In addition, the extent of voluntary
emulation of union pay structures by the nonunion sector (i.e., spillover effects) is likely to be
greater in other countries than in the U.S. due to their larger union sectors.
These latter two aspects of wage-setting lead us to expect lower wage dispersion in both
the union and nonunion sectors in other countries compared to the U.S. Whether the union or
the nonunion effect is larger (relative to the U.S.) is an empirical question. On the one hand,
suppose that the wage spillover due to contact extension and voluntary imitation is virtually
complete in the non-U.S. counties, but that unions in these countries have only a slightly
greater narrowing effect for their members than U.S. unions do. Then we would expect the
nonunion differences in inequality between the U.S. and other counties to be larger because,
outside the U.S., workers not in unions would essentially be treated as union members. On
the other hand, suppose that the spillover to nonunion workers in the non-U.S. counties is
partial and that unions in these counties have a much greater narrowing effect for their
members than U.S. unions do. Then U.S.-non-U.S. differences in union inequality could be
greater than nonunion differences.
These issues were investigated using data on the countries in our sample for which
collective bargaining status was available. Thus, Italy, Australia and Sweden 1984 were
excluded for lack of data. In addition, Sweden 1980 could not be included because of the
small sample of nonunion workers (59) in the data set. With a unionization rate of 85.7
percent,Sweden may be considered essentially a unionized country so that a union-nonunion
comparison may not make a great deal of sense in any case.
Table 4 decomposes the international differences in the overall variance of wages by
union status. It is.constructed along the lines suggested by equation (1) and further developed
in equation (7) below.
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(7) Vu-VJ=
(txau(vaj-vaj) + (lCau)(vnu..vnj)J
÷ EVaj(cau_ctaj) +Vnj{(laa& -(aj)}]
+ (au{(wauw*&2 - (WayW*j)2} +(l_ctalJ){(wfluw*u)2- (Wnj..wj)2}]
+E(WajW*j)2(CcauC(aj)+(WnjW*j)2((1..C(au)-
whereVuandvj are theoverall U.S.and countryj variances in log wages; tXa is the fraction
of workers unionized; Vaandv are the variances of union and nonunion log wages; Waand
are average union and nonunion log wages; and w is the overall average log wage.
The first square-bracketed term of (7) is the Within-Sector Variance Effect which
measures the contribution to the overall wage variance difference of U.S. -country jdifferences
in variances within the union and nonunion sectors. The second square-bracketed term of (7)
is the Within-Sector Composition Effect which measures the contribution to the overallwage
variance difference of U.S.-country jdifferencesin the representation of workers in the high
variance sector. The third square-bracketed term of (7) is the Between-Sector Wage
Differential Effect which measures the contribution to the overallwage variance difference of
relatively highunion-nonunion wage differentialsin one country. Finally, the last square-
bracketed term of (7)is the Between Sector CompositionEffectwhich measures the
contributiontothe overall wage variance difference of a higher representation of employment
in the sector with wages relatively far from theavenge.
Table 4 indicates that the overwhelmingportionof the gap between the U.S. and other
countries in the variance of wages—on average, about 86 percent (O.3320/O.388l)--is due to
higher U.S. variances within the union and nonunion sectors. Mother substantial proportion.
about 12 percent of the avenge U.S.-countryjgap in variances, comes from the Within-Sector
Composition Effect. That is, a higher proportion of U.S. workers are nonunion, and this is
the sector with a larger variance in all countries. The higher union-nonunionwage differential
in the U.S. causes a small widening of the U.S. variance relativeto other countries, with the
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Between-Sector WageDifferential Effect accounting for, on average, about 2 percentofthe
average U.S.-other countryvariance gap.Finally,theBetween-SectorComposition Effect is
found to be negligible.
Table 4implies that the key to understanding 1.1.5.-other country differences in wage
inequalityisexplaining inequality within the union and nonunion sectors. We begin such an
analysisin Table 5,whichprovides summarymeasures of union and nonunion wage
inequality. With the exception of Hungary, wage inequality, as measured by the standard
deviation of the log of wages, is smaller in the union than in the nonunion sector of each
country. For the most part, this is associated with smaller 50-10 and 90-50gapsin the union
sector. While the U.S. conforms to this general pattern, the standard deviation of wages is
greater in both the union and nonunion sectors in the U.S. than elsewhere. And the avenge
1.1.5.-other country differences are similar: 0.259 log points for union workers (0.633 - 0.374)
and 0.270 log points for nonunion workers (0.799 - 0.529). However, mirroring the
aggregate patterns, while the 50-10 gap is larger in both the union and nonunion sectors in the
U.S. thanineach of the other countries, the 90-50gap is aboutthe same (nonunion sector) or
smaller (union sector) in the U.S. Thus,ina descriptive sense, what distinguishes the U.S.
wage distribution from that of other countries in both sectors is the greater spread at the
bottom. Moreover, the U.S.-countryj difference in the 50-10 gap is much larger, on avenge,
forthenonunion sector (0.566 log points) than the union sector (0.285 log points), and in
every case, the intercountry difference is larger for nonunion than union workers.
Together, Tables4and 5 suggest that the higher overall U.S. wage variance is due to a
higher wage variance within both the union and nonunion sectors in the U.S. Moreover, the
higher U.S..variance within each sector is associated with a larger 50-10 gap in both sectors in
the U.S. than elsewhere, with the U.S-countiyj difference in the 50-10 gap being larger for
the nonunion than for the union sector. This is suggestive of larger union spillover effectson
nonunion wage structures in other countries than in the U.S., although it could still be due to
the impact of measured characteristics. In order to shed light on the impact of prices as
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opposed to the distribution of measured skills, we perform the regression-baseddecomposition
outlined inequations(4)-(6)separatelyfor union and nonunionworkersin each country using
thefull specification. That is, we employ the overall regressions for the fullspecification to
obtain the estimated coefficients, but then examine the distributions ofYFULL, Y(l) and Y(2)
separately for union and nonunion workers.24
The results of performing this decomposition for the standard deviation ofwages, and
the 50-10 and 90-50 differentials are shown in Table 6. In eachcase, we present the overall
U.S.-countiyj difference, the Measured Characteristics Effect, and the Wage Structure Effect
(i.e., the sum of the Coefficients and Residual Effects). The findings for theWage Structure
Effect indicate what the U.S.-country j difference would be afteradjusting for differences
between countries in the distribution of measured characteristics. Our discussionof institutions
implies that these labor market prices would lead to a higher dispersion of both unionand
nonunion wages in the U.S. than elsewhere. Looking first at the standarddeviation of log
wages, we find that it continues to be substantially higher in the U.S. in both the union and
nonunion sectors even after taking into account the distribution ofmeasured characteristics.
The wage structure effect is positive (i.e. the U.S. structure raisesthe standard deviation of
the log of wages compared to other countries) in each instance.Moreover, in each case, the
U.S.-countzy.j difference is larger for the nonunion than for the union sectoc theWage
Structure Effect is 0.337 for nonunion workers,on average, compared to 0.243 for union
workers. This same pattern obtains for the 50-10 differential: theU.S. gap remains larger
than that elsewhere in both sectors afteradjustment for the distribution of characteristics, with
the U.S.-country j difference beingconsiderably larger, on avenge, for nonunion than for
union workers (i.e., 0.423 versus 0.284log points). The effect is larger for nonunion workers
in five of seven possible comparisons. Incontrast, while the U.S. does tend to have a larger
24Ideallyone would like to esthpag separate union and nonunionequations to allow the
coefficients to vary across sectors, but,unfortunately, small sample sizes precluded this approach.
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90-50gap than elsewhere after adjustment for the distribution of measured characteristics,the
differencebetween the U.S. and the other countries is smaller and tends to be about the same
size in the nonunion as in the union sector (i.e., 0.192 versus 0. 166 log points, on average).
The nonunion effect is larger than the union effect in four of seven cases.
Thus, after controlling for the distribution of measured characteristics our central
conclusions remain the same: the variance of wages is greater within the nonunion and union
sectors in the U.S. than elsewhere, with the wage structure in other countries tending to be
considerably more compressed at the bottom in both sectors. Moreover, we now find that both
of these features are more pronounced for the U.S. nonunion sector than for the union sector.
These findings are consistent with a considerably more decentralized wage-setting process in
the U.S. union sector and the absence in this country of contract extension and other
mechanisms which extend union-determined wages to the nonunion sector. Evidently, the
spillover from union to nonunion wage structures in the other countries is strong enough to
outweigh the direct effects of centralized bargaining on union workers' wage dispersion.
An additional implication of the wage compression-contract extension phenomenon is
that the union relative wage effect (i.e., union wages compared to nonunion wages, all else
equal) should be higher in the U.S. than in other countries. Further, this effect should be
especially high for U.S. unskilled workers compared to unskilled workers in other countries.
That is, unions in all countries may be expected to raise the wages of low skill more than those
of high skill workers; however, outside the U.S., these effects are transmitted to nonunion
workers to a much greater extent. To probe for the consistency of our findings with this
institutional view, we perform quantile regression analysis for each country. This technique
allows one to analyze given portions of the wage distribution (e.g.. the 10th, 20th, or 50th
percentile) conditional on a set of personal characteristics Z.25
25Forfurther discussion of the quantile regression technique, see Koenker and Bassett (1978)
or Chamberlain (1991).
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Suppose, for example, that we can express the qth percentile of this conditional
distribution for country jas:
(8) YFULLQ IZBqZ,
where YFULLqJZ is the qth percentile of the conditional distribution of hours-corrected
earnings given Z, andis a vector of quantile regression coefficients. Since union
membership is an element of Z, we can make inferences about the impact of unions on the
wage distribution by comparing the union quantile regression coefficients at different portions
of the conditional distribution of wages given Z. An additional benefit of usingquantile
regressions is that we no longer need to assume comparability in the explanatory variable
definitions across countries, as we did in the decompositions in Tables 2, 3 and 6. For
example, in these earlier analyses, we treated a year of schooling as comparable across
countries. In the quantile regression analysis, we merely ask, within eachcountry, what the
union-nonunion pay gap is for workers at different points of thewage distribution, controlling
for education level (and other explanatory variables).
Table 7 provides union membership coefficients from quantile regressions of the form
of equation (8) with the flail specification. The Table indicatesthat, at each point of the
distribution, the U.S. ceteris pan bus union-nonunionwage differential is larger than
elsewhere. The finding of a larger union premium in the U.S. also characterizedour Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) results and has been obtained inprevious OLS analyses (Blanchflower
and Freeman, 1992). It is strongly suggestive of contract extension and othermechanisms by
which union wages in other countries "spill over into the nonunionsector thus lowering their
estimated ceteris paribus union-nonunion differentials relativeto the U.S.
Second, within virtually every country, the union wage effect is larger for the lower
quantiles of the distribution. This is consistent with unionpay-leveling effects—being in. a
unionmattersmore for one's wages the lower down one would have been in the nonunion
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wage distribution. This finding has been obtained in quantile regressions on U.S. data
(Chamberlain, 1991). However, the decline in union effects as we move up the wage
distribution is steeper in the U.S. than elsewhere. For example, in the U.S., the cexeris
pa,rthus union-nonunionpay gap at the 10th percentile is 0.363 and declines to 0.176 at the
median—a decrease of 0.187 log points. In contrast, the nonU.S. average union premium is
0.102 at the 10th percentile and fails to 0.016 at the median, a drop-off of 0.086 log points.
Thus it appears that union pay policies that bring up the bottom of the union wage distribution
ale common to all countries, including the U.S. The difference between the U.S. and the
countries observed here is that, in those countries, such policies are extended to the nonunion
sector to a greater extent. The use of quantile regression increases our confidence that the 50-
10 findings in Table 6 actually reflect pay-setting institutions rather than the impact of
measured characteristics.
The effects of union status continue to decline in almost every case as we proceed from
the 50th percentile to the 90th percentile. The decline for the U.S. is 0.053 log points, and the
average for the other countries is 0.029 log points. These are, in both cases, much less
dramatic than the decreases from the 10th to the 50th percentiles, again suggesting that unions
place particular emphasis on bringing up the bottom relative to restraining the top.
0. An Alternative Explanation: Supply and Demand Effects
The findings in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that prices of labor market skills play an
important role in explaining international differences in inequality, since international
differences in the distribution of measured characteristics do not account for the differences in
wage equality. While the results presented in Tables 4-7 suggest that differences between
countries in union pay-setting institutions are consistent with the observed patterns of wage
inequality, we must also consider the possibility that supply and demand forces in the labor
market are equally consistent.
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To investigatetheimpact of supply and demand, we divide each country's labor force
into three skill groups. To do this, we first pool the entire sample and estimate the following
wage equation:
(9) YFULL=do+dlED+d2EXP+d3EXPSQ+E'c+e
where ED is education, EXP and EXPSQ are potential experience and its square, C is a vector
ofcountrydummies,andEisan error term.26 The estimated coefficients fromequation(9)
were used to computeSKILL,a predictedwagefor each person in each countryj:
(10) SKILLj=d0+diED1+d2EXPj +d3EXPSQj,
Thispredicted wage is a measure ofthepersons skill based on a world-wide pooled regression
includingonly productivity characteristics (andeliminatingcountry shift-terms).
We then divide each country's work forceintothree skillgroups basedonthe following
percentiles ofSKILL: 0-33,33-67, 67l0O.27 These percentiles arecomputed in two ways.
First, weconstruct a setinwhichthepercentiles refer tothecountry's owndistributionof
SKILL, so that theskill groupswill be of the samerelativesize across countries. Thissample
considers skillto be a relativeconcept,with, saythe33rd percentileofSKILLinone country
considered comparable to the33rd percentile ofSKILL in anothercountry. Onecannot
analyze the effectsof relative supply among thesegroups,since, by construction, theyare all
26 Equation (9) was runusing weighted least squares with the weightsbeing (EMP/Sample
Size), where EMP is average male employment in the country for theyears in question and
SampleSizeis the size ofthe microdata sample for the givencountry. Ineffect, weweightby the world-widelikelihood that each worker is a member ofthesample. Employment
information was taken from ILO (1991). The results were similar whenunweighted regressions were used.
27 The intervals are closedat thebottom and open at the top, except for the 67-100 group,
whichis closed at eachend.
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proportionally the same size. Second, we construct a set of skill groups based on the U.S.
cutoffsforSKILL. These percentiles consider skill to be an absolute concept: for example,
those who place below the cutoff for the 33rd percentile of the U.S. distribution of SKILL in
one country are considered comparable to those who place below this level for the SKILL
variable in another country. The relative sizes of the three groups can differ across countries
under this latter definition. A similar analysis is performed separately on the 1984 P511) and
1984 Swedish data sample.
Table 8 provides information on wage differentials by skill group. Panel A compares
skill groups based on own country cutoffs, while Panel B uses U.S. skill-group cutoffs. In
both cases, the findings are similar to those obtained when we simply compared wage
distributions. In particular, there is a larger pay gap between the middle-(33-67) and low-(0-
33)skillgroupsintheU.S. thanineachoftheothercountries. Incontrast, thegapbetween
high-and middle-skill groups tends to be fairly similar in the U.S. as in the other countries: the
U.S. gap is about the same as the non-U.S. avenge when own country cutoffs are used; and
slightly smaller than the non-U.S. avenge when the U.S. cutoffs are employed. Looking
from the top to the bottom, the high (67-100) vs. low (0-33) gap is, with only one exception
(Switzerland using the U.S. cutoffs), larger in the U.S. than in each of the other countries.
For the 1984 U.S.-Sweden comparison, the results are roughly similar when the relative
cutoffs are used in that the U.S.-Swedish difference is considerably larger for the low-middle
gap than for the middle-high gap. When the absolute cutoffs are used, however, .the U.S.-
Swedish difference between the middle-low gaps is now the same size as the difference
between the middle-high gaps. Regardless of the cutoff used, however, the U.S. high-low gap
exceeds the Swedish high-low gap.
To analyze the impact of supply and demand, we construct supply and demand indexes
by skill group for each country relative to the U.S. in a manner similar to Katz and Murphy's
(1992) analysis of changes over time in U.S. inequality. We focus on the results from panel B
above using the U.S. skill group cutoffs since they are more relevant for the supply indexes
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(and the net supply index which we develop below). Thus,the patternwhich we seek to
explain isa relatively high paygap between themiddle-andlow-skillgroups in the U.S.
combinedwith ahigh versus middleskill differential inthe U.S. which tends, withtwo
exceptions (i.e., Sweden 1984 and Norway1982), to be about the sameorsmallerthan
elsewhere.Despitethese countervailing differences, thepaygapbetween the topand bottom
tends ovcrwhelminglyto be higher in the U.S.
Turning first to demand, we wish to know whether the composition of output by
industry (and the consequent derived demand for labor) favors one skill group over another in
the U.S.relativeto other countries. Following Katz and Murphy (1992), we consmjct
industry-occupation cells and view the output' of particular occupationgroupsas an
intermediateproduct
Thefollowing demand index, ln(1 +ADi),was createdforeach skill group kforeach
country relative to the U.S., where:
(11)
where o refers to occupation-industry cell,c.jk is skill group ks share ofemployment in
occupation-industrycelloin the U. S., SE0 is the difference between the U.S. and countryj's
share of total labor input employed in cello, and Ek is the U.S. share of total laborinput
accounted for by skill group St The demand indexthus measuresthe degree towhichthe
occupation-industry structure favors skill group kin countxyj relative to the U.S.,usingU.S.
weights.
Supply indexes55kare computed as follows:
(12) '15k lflEkj -lnEkw
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whereand E are respectively, the share of country j's and the U.S.s totallabor input
consisting of skill group k, using the U.S. cutoffs for skill groups. Thus, the supply indexes
compare the relative representation of each skill group in country j's labor force, using the
U.S. shares as the norm.
We may then compute net supply as:
(13) SNSk =ask-ln(1+aDk)
where ask and 4ADi are defined in equations (11) and (12) above. (Recall that all magnitudes
are in log points and have been normalized relative to the U.S.) As Katz and Murphy (1992)
show using a simple equilibrium model, differences across countries in relative wages for each
skill group will be negatively related to differences in net supply, 4NSk. Intuitively, the
larger the supply of skill group k relative to demand in countryj compared to the U.S., the
worse skill group k will fare in countryjcomparedto the U.S.
Table 9 presents results for the relativedemandindexes by skill group. The actual
entries are of the form ln(l + 4Db) and are approximate percentage effects. The occupation-
industry categories include six industries crossed with three occupation groups.29 Labor input
is measured in hours in PanelA and in earnings in Panel B.29
Theresults in Table 9 indicate that demand tends to ftvor low and middle skill workers
in other countries relative to the U.S., particularly when labor input is measured in earnings.
In addition, when the earnings measure is used, the demand index for the low-skill group is a
The industries are: 1) apiculture; 2) mining, manufacturing and construction; 3)
transportation, communication and public utilities; 4) trade; 5) finance, insurance, real estate
and services; and 6) government. The occupations are 1) managers and professionals; 2)
clerical and sales workers; and 3) craftsworkers, operatives, laborers and service workers.
29Forthe purposes of constructing the demand and supply indexes, the self-employed are
included in all countries. For the 1984 Sweden-U.S. comparison, part-time workers are
included (in addition to full-time workers and the self employed) in measuring the labor input.
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bit (0.044 log points) larger, on avenge, than for the middle-skill group which might be
consistent with a differential in favor of low-skill workers in other countries relative to the
U.S.Incontrast, demand appears less favorable to high-skill workers in other countries
relativeto the U.S.,and this isnot consistentwitha differentialbetween high-andmiddle-skill
workerswhich tends to be the same or larger in other cOuntries than in the U.S. Of course to
fUlly evaluate the consequences of these patterns for relative wages, we need also to take into
accountrelativesupply.
Table10presentsthesupplyindexes with the labor input measured inhours (PanelA)
orin earnings (Panel B). The results indicate that while demand effects may be partially
consistent with the observed wage gaps, supply effects are not. Using both measures (hours
and earnings), other countries have much greater shares of their labor input in low-skill labor
and much smaller shares in high-skill labor. If relative supply were the entire explanation,
then the middle vs. low skill pay gap should be smaller in the U.S. as should the highvs.
middle skill pay gap. These indexes are not consistent with thewage differential findings in
Table 8.
Relative demand and supply are considered together in Table 11 which shows the net
supply indexes. Again, Panel A gives the results when labor input is measured in hours and
Panel B gives the results using earnings. Table 11 clearly shows that thesupply effects swamp
the demand effects for low skill workers. Using bothmeasures, net supply is positive for this
group, on avenge, and within each country. While net supply is also positive, on avenge, for
the middle-skill group, the avenge net supply figure for the low-skillgroup exceeds that for
the middle-skill group for both the hours measure (0.33 1vs. 0.095) and the earnings measure
(0.490 vs. 0.146)." Thus, the supply and demand analysissuggests that low skill workers
30 This is also thecase in nine out of a possible eleven pair-wise (U.S. vs. country j)
comparisonsfor both the hours and earnings measures.
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shouldin general fare wont relative to the middle in other countries than they do in the U.S.
andcannot explain the smaller low-middle skill differentials that prevail in these countries.
In contrast to the pattern forthelow skill group, the net supply effects for the high skill
group are consistently negative. Further, they are, on avenge, quite large in absolute value
(i.e.,-0.785 using the hours measureand -0.710usingthe earnings measure). While in two
cases(Italyand Sweden1984) net supply is also negativeformiddle-skillworkers(using both
measures), innone of thefour possible cases isthe netsupplyfigureforthe high-skillgroup
larger than the net supply figure for the middle-skill group. Thus, supply and demand analysis
would predict differentials in favor of high-skill workers in other countries relative to the U.S.
Whilethis may be consistent with the findings from Panel B of Table 8 that the U.S.
differentialis moderately (.034) smaller than the non-U.S. average, when we consider the high
(67-100) vs. low (0-33) wage differential, the results are inconsistent with the predictions of
supply and demand analysis in virtually every case. Table 11 indicates that high-skill workers
are considerably scarcer relative to low-skill workers in other countries relative to the U.S.,
yet Table 8 shows that with one exception (Switzerland), they earn more relative to low-skill
workers in the U.S. than elsewhere.
Thus, differences in relative supplies and demands for skill in other countries compared
to the U.S. do not appear to be broadly consistent with the observed pattern of relative wages
by skill in other countries compared to the U.S. In particular, they do not explain the most
striking difference between the U.S.andthe other countries, namely their greater wage
compression at the bottom relative to the top or the middle. Having said that, we must note
some important qualifications. First, since relative wages for low skill workers are higher in
all countries than in the U.S. and we use an employment-based measure of industry demand,
we may have understated the demand for low skill workers that would occur at constant wages
relative to the U.S. Similar reasoning implies that our supply estimates may have been
overstated. Thus, we may have overestimated net supply at constant relative prices. Second,
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our demand index does not include any differences across countries in within industry-
occupation demands for skill. It is unclear what effect this might have on our results.
Third, we have implicitly assumed a separability in production between other factors
and the three skill groups. However, other factors such as women's labor may not be equally
substitutable for male labor of different skill levels. Topel (1992), fix example, has suggested
that women's labor is more substitutable on average for low skill than for high or medium skill
men. In our data, women's work hours account for a larger share of total hours worked in the
U.S. (about 44%) than in the other countries (36%, on average). Topel's (1992)findings
suggest that the relatively poor showing of low skill men in the U.S. could be duo to its high
female labor supply. While this phenomenon may explain a portion of our results, we believe
that it is not the whole story. In particular, as shown in the next subsection, female labor
supply differences across countries are much less closely related to differences in male wage
inequality than are differences in wage-setting institutions.
Finally, we note that our findings may reflect an interplay of institutions and market
forces. That is, given wage-setting institutions, it is possible that the wage gap between
middle-and low-skill workers in other countries relative to the U.S. is larger than it would
have been under more favorable net supply conditions for low-skill workers. Similarly, the
high vs.middleskill differential in other countries might well have been more compressed
relative to the U.S. had net supply conditions for high skill workers been less favorable. Even
if this is the case, however, it does not negate the strength of the institutional forces. Indeed,
the finding that the most striking difference between the U.S. distribution and that in the other
industrialized countries in our sample—the greater compression at the bottom of the wage
distribution—occurs in the face of supply and demand forces which would have produced the
opposite result is powerful evidence in favor of the importance of wage setting institutions.
E. The Effects of Institutions: Toward a General Test
The evidence so fax has suggested that the relatively decentralized wage-setting system
in the United States is responsible for at least some of this country's higher wage dispersion
WTWAC.DCC Vfl194 3:31 P14-35-
and greater spread atthe bottomofthe distribution comparedtothe OECD countriesinour
sample.While our sample is relatively small (10), it is still possible to investigatewhether this
relationship between centralization and the wage distribution holds generally, i.e. beyond the
individual U.S.-other country comparisons which we have madeup to this point. Performing
sucha testrequires oneto operationalizethe concept of centralization in wagesetting.Several
authorshave producedrankingsof countrieswithrespect to their extentofcentralization,
includingBlyth(1979),Bruno andSachs(1985), Calmfors andDriffihl (1988),Cameron
(1984), and Schmitter (1981).Theserankings take into accountthe degreeofcoordination
within and between labor and management organizations, the level at whichbargaining takes
place, and the power of central bodies to conductwagenegotiations (Calmfors and Driffihl,
1988). We use as a measure of centralization the unweighted avenge of these rankings(which
are shown individually in Calnifors and Driffill, 1988, p. 18), correcting for differencesacross
authors in the number of countries ranked.
Based on this average ranking, Austria, with a ranking of 1.493 out of 17 countries,
had the most centralized wage-setting system among the countries inour sample; while the
U.S., with a ranking of 15. 191 out of 17, not surprisingly, had the least.3' WhileHungary as
aCommunistcounty in the 1980s was not included in the rankings; we assigned it the highest
level of centralization since the government setwages there. The resultswere qualitatively
similar when Hungary was excluded from the analyses.
We then used this cmv) measure of centnlinrion (DECEN1) as anexplanatory
variable in two kinds of analyses. First, we ran regressions with the followingdependent
variables: i) the country's standard deviation of YFULL (i.e., the log of hours'corrected
earnings, as shown in Table 1); u-lu) the 50-10 and 90-50 differentials in YFULL (Table 1);
iv-v) the 50-10 and 90-50 prices effects (i.e., YFULL net of personal characteristics) for the
31Thedegree of centraliliflon for the other countries in our sample was: West Germany
6.943; Britain 12.632;Switzerland10.904; Sweden 2.736; Norway 2.536; Australia 10.766;
and Italy 14.325.
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counbyin question relative to the U.S. with the full specification (Fable SB).32 In addition,
in light of Topel's (1992) findings on the impact of female labor supply on male wage
inequality, we included the log of the share of total hours worked by women (LNFEM) as an
explanatory variable in some specifications.33
The second kind of aggregate cross-country analysis involved estimating the
determinants of the middle-low and high-middle skill group log wage differentials, as shown in
Table 8 (absolute skill groups—i.e., U.S. cutoffs for SKILL—were used here). Explanatory
variables in this case included DECENT, the log of relative female labor supplymeasuredin
hours, and relative net supply. For example, in the analysis of the middle-low skill group
wage differential, the net supply of middle skill relative to the low skill group was included as
a right-hand variable. Since the net supply measures are defined relative to the U.S. (Fable
11), we define the wage differentials and female labor supply relative to the U.S. as well.3'
Tables 12 and 13 contain our results. The major findings are for DECENT and are
strildng. First, decentralization of wage setting is found to be positively associated with the
standard deviation of log wages (Fable 12). This effect is 2.6-2.9 times its standard error and
holds whether or not female labor supply is included and whether or not the effects of the
distribution of male personal characteristics have been removed. At the mean value of
DECENT, the coefficients imply an elasticity of the standard deviation of wages of 0.10-0.12.
Second,aswas the case in the U.S.-countryj comparisons of Table 1, wage
compression at the bottom of the distribution appears responsible for the association between
centralization and the overall log wage variance. For example, in Table 12, decentralized
32 In these analyses, the two observations on Norway were averaged using sample size as
weights. Sweden 1984 was excluded since the wage variable in that analysis was defined as
log of actual hourly earnings, unlike the rest of the sample.
The results were unchanged when female labor input was measured as the share of all
earnings accounted for by women.
' The U.S. was included and given zeroes for relative wages and relative female labor
supply.DECENTis, up to a constant, already defined relative to the U.S.
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wage-settinghas a positive associationwiththe 5010 log wage differential. The effect is
robustwithrespect to controlling forthe distributionofmale personal characteristics andthe
inclusion of relativefemale laborsupply. It is 2.2-3.8timesits standard error and implies an
elasticity of the 50-10 wage ratioof0.12-0.25. Similarfindingsforcompressionat the bottom
ofthe distribution are obtained in Table 13 which exaznineswagedifferentials between skill
groups. Specifically,decentralization ofwage-settinghasa positiveassociationwiththe
middle-low skilllog wagegap whether or notwe controlforrelative net supply of thesetwo
groupsand relative female labor supply. The DECENTeffectsfor the middle-lowdifferential
in Table 13 are 2.0-2.5timestheir standard errors and correspond to elasticities of 0.09-0.10.
In contrast to the strong positive association between centralizationand wage
compression at the bottom of the distribution, DECENT hasvery weak effects on compression
at the top. In Tables 12 and 13, decentralization of pay-setting has smallpositive effects on
the 90-50 or high-middle skill group wagegap which are in every case but two smaller than
their standard errors.
Incontrast to the findings for DECENT on wage compression at the bottom of the
distribution, the results for female labor supply are mixed and generally notprecisely
estimated. In Table12,greater female labor supply is associated with a larger 50-10 maleS
wage differential (as predicted by Topel's (1992) results), but the effect is smaller than its
standard error in three of four cases, and is not significant in thespecification where we
control for measured male personal charactethtics. In Table 13, female laborsupply has the
wrongwsignfor the middle-low wage gap (i.e. it is negatively associated with thegap) and is
0.3 times its standard error. Finally, the effects of female laborsupply on overall male wage
variance (Table 12) and wage compression between thetop and the middle of the distribution,
as shown in Tables 12 and 13, change sign depending on specification andare in all cases but
onesmallerthantheirstandard errors.
The effects of net supply shown in Table 13 are also mixed. On theone hand, net
supply has the Nwrongw sign for the middle-low wage gap—it is positively associated with this
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gap;however, it is smaller than its standard error. On the other hand, net supply is negatively
associated with the high-middle pay gap, as predicted and suggested by Tables 8 and 11, and is
1.9 times its standard error.
The results of Tables 12 and 13 suggest that wage centralization leads to less wage
inequality generally and that it has a particularly strong effect in bringing up the bottom of the
wage distribution. Admittedly, our sample of countries is extremely small—only 10; and the
causality between the wage distributionandwage setting institutions, as well as our measures
of female labor supply and net male labor supply, can run in both directions. However, these
results in conjunction with the individual U.S.-other countzy comparisons lend plausibility to
the idea that institutions are important.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper, we have compared male wage inequality in the U.S. and nine other
industrialized countries primarily in the middle to late l980s. Consistent with previous work,
the results indicate that overall wage inequality is much greater in the U.S. than elsewhere.
Interestingly, however, when we disaggregate the measure of inequality to examine various
parts of the wage distribution, we find that the distribution in other countries is much more
compressed at the bottom relative to the U.S. than at the top. Thus, while the 50-10
differential is considerably larger in the U.S. than elsewhere, the U.S. 90-50 differential is
quitesimilar tothat in other countries.
We then evaluated several possible explanations for these patterns of inequality. First,
differences in the distribution of measured characteristics across countries were found to be
responsible for some but not all of the international differences in the wage distribution. If the
U.S. had other countries' distribution of measured characteristics, its overall wage variation
would remain much higher than elsewhere. Moreover, while the gap between the middle and
bottom portions of the U.S. wage distribution would be reduced, the high-middle gap would
be increased. Most importantly, the wage distribution in other countries would still be more
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compressed at the bottom than at the top relative to the U.S. These results suggests thatU.S.
labor market prices contribute to our observed fmdings.
Second,we noted that,unlike the U.S., most of the other countries have very
centralized systems of collective bargaining and many haveprovisions to extend the terms of
unioncontactsto nonunionworkers.Voluntary emulation by nonunion finns of the union
wage structure due to threat effects is also expected to be greater in these other countries given
the larger size of their union sectors. Consistent with these observations, we found a larger
variance of wages and less wage compression at the bottom within both the U.S. union and
nonunion sectors compared to other countries. Indeed, the larger variance of overallwages in
the U.S. is primarily due to the higher variance that prevails here within each of these sectors.
Moreover, controlling for the distribution of measured characteristics, both of these salient
features of the U.S. distribution-a higher wage variance and a lesser compression at the
bottom—are more pronounced in the nonunion than in the union sector. This result suggests
that contact extension and other mechanisms which extend union-determined wages to the
nonunion sector have a larger effect on their wage structures relative to the U.S. than do their
more centralized wage-setting institutions within the union sector.
Third, we examined indexes of relative supplies and demands across countries to see
whether market forces could provide an alternative explanation for the observed patterns,
particularlyforthe high relative wages of low skilled workers in other countries. Demand
effects were found to be weakly consistent with the greater non-U.S. compression at the
bottom, but relative supply was inconsistent with this pattern. Taking both supply and demand
into account suggested that low-skill workers should fare wone relative to the middle in other
countries than they do in the U.S. and cannot explain the smaller low-middle skill differentials
that prevail in these countries. Thus, market forces, as best as we could measure them, do not
appear to be consistent with the observed pattern of relative wages by skill in other countries
compared to the U.S.
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Finally, wepresent evidence that wage centralization,as commonlymeasured by
comparativeindustrialrelationsresearchers,isnegativelyassociatedwithwage dispersion,the
50-10 differential in thelogof wages, and the pay gap between middleandlow skill workers.
Further, this compression at the bottom occurs even when we control for the distribution of
personal characteristics, relative female labor supply, and relative male labor supply net of
demand differences.
Our findings provide strong evidence for the importance of labor market institutions in
explaining international differences in the levels of wage inequality. To the extent that
institutions are important, we would expect adverse impacts on employment and productivity
due to resource allocation effects. To some degree, labor market policies such as government
employment or training programs and relocation subsidies can compensate for such effects.
One interpretation of government labor market policy in many OECI) countries, then, is that
wage-leveling policies are encouraged by the government on the one hand to achieve a desired
level of wage inequality. The greater compression at the bottom, in particular, suggests that
these other countries use the labor market to a greater extent than in the U.S. to provide a
safety net" for low wage workers. On the other hand, the more activist government policies
regarding employment, training and relocation often found in these countries (see, e.g., Edin
and Holmhind, forthcoming) may be seen in part as corrective measures for the adverse -
employmentand allocation effects of the wage distribution policies.
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Variable Definitions, Means and Earnings Regression Results by Country
Definitions of the explanatory variables are given in Table A-i. Theearnings
definitions for each country are listed below:
Austria: Net Monthly Income from Employment
Germanyand Switzerland: Net Income per Month after taxes and social
insurance
Italy: Annual labor income
Britain: Total annual earnings before taxes
USA: Previous year's earnings from occupation before taxes
Hungary: Monthly earnings
Sweden: Income (from all sources) in previous year
Norway: Annual income from all jobs.
Australia: Annual earnings from all jobs.Table A-i
DermitionsofExplanatory Variables
EDUC =yearsof schooling completed
PEXP=age-EDTJC-6
PEXPSQ =PEXPsquared
EXP =actualexperience (P50 and HUS only)
EXPSQ =EXPsquared (PSID and HUS only)
MAR =1if marned spouse present and 0 otherwise
UNION =dummyvariable for union membership
Occupation dummyvariables:










AG =agriculture,forestry and fisheries
MINCON =miningand construction
MANDUR =durablegoods manufacturing
MANNON nondurable goods manufacturing
TRANS =transportation,communications and utilities
WTRADE =wholesaletrade
RTRADE =retailtrade
FIRE =finance,insurance and real estate
SERVS =services






TRADE =wholesaleand retail trade
SERVS =services,finance insurance and real estate
GOVT (see above), the omitted category
Occupation dummy variables for Australia:
MGR =managersand farm managers
CLER, CRAFT, and OPER (see above)
LAB=laborersand farm laborers
SALESW =salesand service workers
PROF (see above), the omitted category
INTWAQDOC2120194 9:34 PMTable A-i, cont'd
Definitions of Explanatory Variables
Industrydummy variables for Australia:
AG, TRANS, MJNCON(seeabove)
MANUF = manufacturing
TRADE = wholesale and retail trade
FJSERV=finance,insurance,real estate and services
GOVT(see above), theomitted category
Occupation dummy variablesfor Italy:
BLUE=bluecollar
WHITELOW=lowerlevel white collar
WHITEHI= higher level white collar, the omittedcategory
Industry dummyvariables for Italy:
AG, TRAINS, TRADE (seeabove)
IND=Mining,Construction and Manufacturing
FIRE, GOVT (see above)
SERVS (see above), the omitted category
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SUMMARY MEASURES OP WAGE INEQUALITY
50-10 90-50 90-10
Standard Percentile Percentile Percentile
Deviation Differential Differential Differential
A. Log Hours-Corrected Earnings
Germany 0.470 0.456 0.539 0.995
Bñtain 0.489 0.594 0.683 1.277
USA 0.772 1.040 0.552 1.592
Austria 0.424 0.391 0.508 0.899
Switzerland 0.549 0.464 0.777 1.241
Sweden 1980 0.523 0.382 0.452 0.834
Norway 1982 0.441 0.372 0.382 0.754
Australia 0.622 0.755 0.439 1.194
Hungary 0.431 0.462 0.661 1.123
Italy 0.488 0.478 0.486 0.964
Norway 1989 0.360 0.224 0.525 0.749
Non-US Average
lUnweighted) 0.480 0.458 0.545 1.003
B. Log Hourly Earnings
Sweden 1984 0.343 0.254 0.388 0.642
USA 1984 0.543 0.772 0.546 1.318
INTT1.XL$ 12/1/93 307 PM (.Mw6nd.4,JTABLE 2
DEcOMPOSmON OF THE US-COUNTRY .1 DIFFERENCES
IN THE STANDARD DEVIATION OF LOG WAGES
US Std Dcv Measured Wage Wage
- Country j Characteristics Coefficients Equation
Std 0ev Effect Effect Residual Effect
A. Human Capital Specification
Germany 0.301 0.008 0.020 0174
Britain 0.283 0.044 0.021 0.218
Austria 0.348 0.006 0.062 0.279
Switzerland 0.223 0.001 0.035 0.187
Sweden 1980 0.248 0.034 0.017 0.197
Norway 1982 0.331 0.018 0.047 0.266
Australia 0.150 0.014 0.036 0.100
Hungary 0.340 0.038 0.078 0.224
Italy 0.284 -0.0004 0.048 0.236
Norway 1989 0.411 0.023 0.042 0.347
Sweden 1984 0.200 -0.001 - 0.069 0.132
Non-US Average
(Unweightedl 0.284 0.017 0.043 0.224
B. Full Specification
Germany 0.301 0.021 0.032 0.248
Britain 0.283 0.037 0.037 0.209
Austria 0.348 0.008 0.075 0.265
Switzerland 0.223 .0.004 0.032 0.195
Sweden 1980 0.248 0.032 0.018 0.198
Norway 1982 0.331 0.014 0.071 0.246
Australia 0.150 0.007 0.051 0.092
Hungary 0.340 0.025 0.111 0.205
Italy 0,284 0.020 0.037 0.227
Norway 1989 0.411 0.008 0.076 0.327
Sweden 1984 0.200 0.011 0.080 0.109
Non-US Average
(Unweighted) 0.284 0.016 0.056 0.211
INflLXLS2/21)9433O PM (.Uw&ndad.)TABLE 3
DECOMPOSITION OF THE US-COUNTRY J DIFFERENCES IN
THE 50-10 AND 90-50 DIFFERENTIALS IN LOG WAGES























































(Unweighted) 0.576 0.245 0.024 0.307










































(Unweighted) 0.021 -0.157 0.089 0.089
INTTtXLS 2)21/94 3:36 PM (S1w64.4.zJ.pTABLE 3 CONT'D
DECOMPOSmON OF THE USC0UNThY J DIFFERENCES IN











50-10 Log Wage Differential
Germany 0.584 0.301 0.087 0.216
Britain 0.448 0.010 0.192 0.244
AustrIa 0.649 0.208 0.144 0.297
Switzerland 0.576 0.218 0.170 0.188
Sweden 1980 0.658 0.294 0.205 0.159
Norway 1982 0.668 0.370 0.057 0.241
Australia 0.285 0.127 0.046 0.112
Hungary 0.578 0.145 0.174 0.259
Italy 0.562 0.233 0.092 0.237
Norway 1989 0.816 0.212 0.129 0.475
Sweden 1984 0.519 0.164 0.104 0.250
Non-US Average
lUnweighted) 0.576 0.207 0.125 0.243
90-50 Log Wags Differential
Germany 0.013 -0.177 0.091 0.099
Britain -0.131 -0.149 -0.056 0.074
Austria 0.044 -0.151 0.093 0.102
Switzerland -0.225 -0.231 0.049 0.055
Sweden 1980 0.100 -0.091 0.080 0.111
Norway 1982 0.170 -0.191 0.166 0.195
Australia 0.113 -0.129 0.098 0.144
Hungary -0.109 -0.206 0.196 -0.099
Italy 0.066 -0.108 0.048 0.126
Norway 1989 0.027 -0.132 0.058 0.103
Sweden 1984 0.158 -0.140 0.132 0.166
Non-US Average
(Unweighted) 0-021 -0.155 0.078 0.098






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































USA . O.633 0.689 0.416 1.106
Austria 0.348 0.365 0.446 0.811
Switzerland 0.430 0.447 0.779 1.228
Norway 1982 0.321 0.445 0.290 0.735
Hungary . 0.410 0.511 0.606 1.117
Norway 1989 0.309 0.185 0.508 0.691
Non-US Average
IUnwelgfltedl 0.374 0.404 0.524 0.927
B. Nonunion Workers
Germany 0.525 0.513 0.559 1.072
Britain . 0.536 0.641 0.816 1.457
USA 0.799 1.082 0.622 1.704
Austria 0.506 0.459 0.519 1.038
Switzerland 0.625 0.479 0.781 1.260
Norway 1982 0.614 0.626 0.575 1.201
Hungary 0.461 0.386 0.626 1.012































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EFFECTSOF CENTRAUZATION OF WAGE-SETTING AND FEMALE LABOR
















































Note: DECENT is defined in the text and Is an Inverse measure ofwage-setting centralization; LNFEM
is the log of th. share of total work hours accounted for bywomen. A constant term Is included in all
regressions.
Standard Deviation of YFULL 0.0133 0.0148 0.0392 0.1747












INTSAMS.XLS 21211943:11 PMTABLE 13





































Sample Size 10 10 10 10
Note: Variables are relative to the U.S. DWMIDLOW and DWHIMID are m4ddle-Iow and high-middle
skill group log wage gaps; net supply is the relative net supply of th. relevant pair of skill groups;
female labor supply is LNFEM.
INTSAMS.X1.S V21194 304 PM